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Animal Rights vs. Humanism: The Charge of Speciesism
Kenneth Joel Shapiro
Abstract
The present article examines a concern I have had for some
time about the compatibility of humanistic psychology with the
emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my position,
the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political
purpose of bringing animal rights issues to the attention of
humanistic psychologists.
The article applies certain concepts of contemporary animal
rights philosophy, notably "speciesism," to both the philosophy
of humanism and humanistic psychology. While on a philosophical
level, certain concepts are discussed that would likely block a
rapprochement, I feel that humanistic psychologists as
individuals are likely to extend their compassion to nonhuman
animals.
A review of philosophical humanism reveals that its
important concept of individuality excludes nonhuman animals.
Within this conception, animals simply are not individuals. In
fact, animals are employed as a categorical foil representing
precisely the absence of reason and relative autonomy, hallmarks
of individuality.
In humanistic psychology, the concept of self actualization
is open to similar charges. A compatability and, hence a
reconciliation, is suggested through a phenomenological rendering
of empathy, a second concept critical to humanistic psychology.
Introduction
You probably think humanistic psychology has enough
problems with the antihumanistic drift of much of postmodern
thought. Derrida's deconstructionism (1976), Barthes'
certification of the "death of the author" (1977), and Foucault's
archaeology (1973) demolished our sense of identity and worth as
human beings, as did science's technologism, the computer's
neoformalism, and psychology's continued reductionistic
scientism. Then American bornagain fundamentalism recast
secular humanism as the devil. Well, here is another problem.
To put it baldly and provocatively, is humanistic psychology
speciesist? Is humanism necessarily a position built on the
valuing of one species at the expense of others? If it is, is it
then compatible with a contemporary animal rights movement which
seeks to question and overcome, at least in terms of ethical
obligations, most traditional distinctions among animal species?
Beginning with a brief introduction to the animal rights
movement, I will offer a reading, first, of the history and

critique of classical humanism, and, second, of the history of
humanistic psychology. In the course of that reading, I will
examine the nature and grounds of a charge of speciesism against
humanism and humanistic psychology, and suggest a way to a
satisfactory plea bargain, though not yet to a dismissal of the
case.
My credentials as attorney for the defense of humanistic
psychology are mixed if not downright suspicious. For the past
seven years I have been actively involved in the animal rights
movement, primarily through Psychologists for the EthicalÜd22222Ü
Treatment of Animals, an organization which I co©founded and of
which I am currently executive director. A bit more auspiciously
for this readership, I identify myself as an existentialªphenomenologist,
and am a practicing clinician.
Beneath the vagary of bringing you to trial only to defend
you, my actual purpose is frankly political. I want to swear you
in as vigilantes. I seek to persuade you to join me in doing for
rats what you set out to do for humans more than 25 years ago.
Following Wertz (1986), I take rats as the symbol of psychology's
exploitation of nonhuman animals. I choose the term
"exploitation" carefully. Whether or not the use of animals as
subjects in laboratory research can be justified in any or all
instances, that use is almost entirely for our human benefit, not
for animals' benefit, and is, on balance, clearly harmful to
them. Hence, they are an exploited group. Together, let us
restore to them a full respect for their being and worth. In
doing so, we may restore our own.
My brief in short
Since the argument is involved or at least extensive, allow
me to highlight it as follows: Taking the Enlightenment as its
onset, modern humanistic thought is defined as "free reason."
This notion of rationality distinguishes "human" from the God of
traditional religious dogma and from nonhuman animals lodged in a
prerational nature. Critiques of this move, which so discretely
demarcates human being, issue from several quarters©©
environmentalism, the animal rights movement, and contemporary
accounts of the power of various sociohistorical forces (egs.,
economic institutions, language, and social science itself). In
common, the critiques challenge that discrimination of humans
based on their possession of reason, seeing it as a self©serving
and arbitrary categorical divide.
An important consequence of the categorical overcorrections
into such dichotomies as human/God and human/nonhuman animal, is
a methodological overcorrection which denies our access as
investigators to all beings, including other human beings, except
through the externality of rational inference. This
methodological overcorrection is embodied in the natural
sciences, which in its modernist form is largely the creation of
humanism. Ironically, many developments in contemporary humanism
now are critical of this form of science as a significant
dehumanizing force.
I introduce the philosophy of animal rights by organizing it
around the concept of speciesism. This concept is compared and

contrasted with racism and sexism. A center of the paper is an
examination of speciesism as a charge against humanism.
Humanistic psychology is analyzed as the modification of
free reason to "free©self." While offering a fuller notion of
rationality, I argue that it has not overcome the structural
errors of its origins in philosophical humanism. The result is an
implicit derogation and distanciation of nonhumans vis©a©vis
humans. I suggest a way out of this alienated and ethically
questionable position in which humanistic psychology finds itself
by replacing self-actualization as its conceptual center with a
modified notion of empathy.
The politics of the animal rights movement
Crystallized around the publication of Singer's ”Animal
Liberation• (1975), the contemporary animal rights movement
quickly grew, utilizing various activist, conventional political,
legal and extralegal tactics to realize a broad spectrum of goals
(MacCauley, 1987; Martin, 1982; and Singer, 1985). Currently,
virtually no institution touching on the lives of nonhuman
animals escapes its scrutiny. Notable targets are factory
farming, product testing, laboratory research, and hunting and
trapping. While there is considerable overlap, the movement is
distinguishable from environmentalism and deep ecology in its
goals and philosophy, particularly its focus on individual
animals as the relevant objects of moral concern, rather than on
species or ecosystems.
With respect to the issue of the use and treatment of
animals in laboratory research, psychology has received a
disproportionate share of criticism (egs., Singer, 1975; Rollin,
1981). In fact, two psychologists, one largely through the topic
of his research (Wade, 1976) and the other through his treatment
of his animal subjects (Rowan, 1984), have provided the ”causes
cá‚áláŠábres• which helped establish and maintain biomedical and
psychological research as a major focus of the animal rights
movement. More recently, radical factions of the movement have
used the tactic of breaking into facilities, making or stealing
and disseminating video or other incriminating records of
experimental procedures, treatment, and housing conditions. In
part fueled by the evidence and limelight so provided, more
moderate groups promote the notion of "alternatives" to animal
research, borrowing the broad concept of replacement, reduction
and refinement from Russell and Burch (1959). The development of
alternatives is not an abolitionist program, for it includes
attempts to make experimental procedures less invasive
(refinement) and to reduce the numbers of animals through design
modification, in addition to the full replacement of the use of
live animals.
Two publications featuring the presentation of such
alternatives are ”Alternatives to Laboratory Animals,” published by
Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments, and
”Humane Innovations and Alternatives in Animal Experimentation•,
published by Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.â. Other
more or less moderate tactics include the constitution of institutional

animal care committees (reviewing bodies modelled after human subject
review committees),litigation based on existing state anti-cruelty laws
(which,however, exempt research in some states [Leavitt, 1978]), and
additional Federal regulation through the Animal Welfare Act and
amendments to it.
Unfortunately, the response of the American Psychological
Association (APA) through this period has been "one step forward,
two back." While developing guidelines which at least recognize
levels of invasive use and call for greater justification at more
invasive levels (APA, 1985), factions within the APA largely deny
the possibility of alternatives in behavioral research (Gallup,
1985), balk at regulations that would meaningfully implement
recent Federal animal welfare legislation (such as that providing
for the "psychological well-being of primates") (APA, 1986),
declaw any mechanism within the profession that would effectively
identify alleged abusers (only case investigated from 1982
through 1985; Ethics Committee of the APA, 1986), and block the
institution within APA's governance of a committee that would
provide advocacy for animal welfare comparable to that
established for women and ethnic minorities (Shapiro, 1983).
While humanistic psychology has not been a direct target of
the political and activist animal rightists, a number of scholars
have pointed to humanistic psychology and to humanism more
generally as an underlying philosophic position providing
conceptual ground and sustaining justification for current
practices involving the exploitation of animals (Clark, 1984;
Singer, 1975; Cave, 1982). The story I tell below examines that
humanistic foundation.
The concept of speciesism: The derogation and negation of animal
interests
The emerging ethic that provides the philosophic foundation
of this contemporary animal rights movement (Singer, 1975;
Regan, 1983) builds on a concept of speciesism. The term
"speciesism" is owed to Ryder (1975, Chap. 1), who defines it as
follows:
…`speciesism describe[s] the widespread discrimination that
is practiced by man [sic] against the other species...(p.5)
Singer defines speciesism as:
A prejudice or attitude of bias toward the
interests of members of one's own species and against
those of members of other species" (1975, p.7).
Ryder and Singer both use the term speciesism to invoke parallels
to racism and sexism and to thereby legitimate the goals of the
animal rights movement as the inevitable next ring in an
expanding circle of compassion.
My explication of the concept here prepares the way for a
critique of the compatibility of an emerging animal rights ethic
with contemporary humanistic psychology. In its rescue of human
being from its more or less exclusive study in a laboratory-based
positivistic psychology, will an evolving neohumanism take

nonhuman animals with it? Or, will neohumanism abandon animals by
continuing the conceptual tactic employed by philosophical
humanism of using "animal" as a categorical foil for human being?
By definition, the three concepts of racism, sexism, and
speciesism all refer to discrimination that tends to promote or
encourage domination and exploitation of members of one group by
another. A speciesist prejudice is, then, a political act in the
broadest sense. The discriminatory act or policy need not be
intentionally exploitative©©we have all been caught unwittingly
making a remark that justly receives the charge of sexist or
racist. Nor need any comparison drawn or implied be false; the
comparison need only be an invidious one. As we are all aware in
the cases of sexism and racism, often comparisons are empirically
true but largely or wholly a result of the history of
discrimination itself. More insidiously, the very differences
created by a pattern of discrimination are then relabelled to
justify continued discrimination. For example, laziness and
emotionality, more aptly labelled lack of opportunity and
expression of frustration, are used to rationalize the exclusion
of a group of individuals from the right to participate in an
economic or political process.
Another layer of what soon becomes a recalcitrant and selfperpetuating phenomenon results from the fact that often the
attribute selected as the basis of a sexist or racist or
speciesist comparison is irrelevant to the discrimination it
purports to justify. Examples are certain cosmetic, physical, and
intellective attributes. When habitually practiced,
discrimination by the members of one class against another causes
the discriminators to think differently about their victims and
to use different language to refer to them, thus intensifying the
prejudice. Classes at least generically equivalent are,
nonetheless, arrayed hierarchically: we speak of the stronger
and weaker or second sex, and higher and lower animals. As
Midgley points out, the latter metaphor of height applied to
animal species is inappropriate even in terms of evolutionary
theory. "The truth is, there can be no evolutionary ladder.
Creatures diverge,..., each finding its own characteristic sort
of fulfillment" (1978, p. 159). Rather than evolutionary ladder,
a metaphor derived from the pre-Darwinian "great chain of being",
she suggests a bush, that is a radial rather a hierarchical
arrangement of the species.
Animals as objects of moral concern
To make a credible charge that certain institutionalized
practices are examples of speciesism, the victims must be
established to be objects of worth or value. Of course, the
argument by animal rightists that animals are not so valued
because of speciesism, while no doubt true, offers little
purchase. The tack taken by most contemporary philosophers of
animal ethics, including the two major thinkers, Singer and
Regan, is to argue the worth of animals by establishing that they
are, obligatorily, "objects of moral concern" (Singer, 1975). To
make this claim they first elucidate the relevant criterion for

any entity to be an object of moral concern. What is it about a
being that obligates us to treat it with consideration of the
right and wrong of our action in regard to it? Both Singer and
Regan rule out certain features often attributed exclusively to
human beings, such as rationality, intelligence, or language.
Following Bentham's utilitarianism, Singer argues that sentience,
particularly the capacity for enjoyment and pain, is the relevant
aspect. Since there are consequences of our actions in regard to
nonhuman animals of which they can be aware, it follows that they
have "interests" and that we owe them, ethically, "equal
consideration of their interests." Incidentally, Singer does not
extend the claim of "interests" to plants for, in his utilitarian
account, they do not feel pain or suffering. Hence, he would not
follow Stone (1974) in claiming legal standing for trees on the
basis of their having interests that can be violated. (Stone
recently retracted this particular claim for standing, calling
trees "disinteresteds", and arguing a somewhat weaker legal
status for natural objects [Varner, 1987]).
Regan argues that the morally relevant aspect of animal
being is that animals are the "subjects of a life." By virtue of
this morally relevant criterion, he moves beyond Singer's
utilitarian position to the claim that they are right©bearers and
we must take their rights into consideration. This means that a
nonhuman animal is an individual with natural rights and that
under certain circumstances the rights of that individual must
trump or preempt the rights of a group (Dworkin, 1977). Other
philosophers take purpose (Caplan, 1983) or telos (Rollin, 1981)
as the requisite morally relevant aspect.
Ryder and Singer convincingly establish the similarities
between the conceptual structure of speciesism and of racism and
sexism, and show striking parallels in the kind of arguments that
have issued from these prejudices in different historical
periods. In her recent book, Spiegel (1988) presents a more
extended study of what she calls the dreaded comparison between
our treatment of blacks historically and of nonhuman animals
presently. Let me briefly indicate one or two additional
similarities and apparent differences as well, some of which
suggest certain complexities for a concept of speciesism.
Racists and sexists clearly both discriminate against
certain individuals by denigrating a group of which those
individuals are members. However, to a more exclusive extent than
these, a speciesist further and more subtly discriminates by
”reifying• those categories of species of which he or she is not a
member. When we speak of "the black" and of "women" our referent
tends to be a stereotypic individual. Further, when we speak of,
for example, "the status of women in contemporary society," we
intend a prototype as it is instantiated by the aggregate of
individual women. However, when we speak of, for examples,
culling deer or the regrettable decline of the mountain gorilla
or the market value of chicken, our primary referent is a supra-entity,
the species. Managing wildlife through culling and
harvesting is precisely for the sake of the species instead of
consideration of individual members of the species. Individual
members are forgotten as objects of concern by a device of

semantic absorption of individuals into a now reified class as
object.
This is ironic, for there is an extensive literature in the
philosophy of biology on the controversial question of whether a
species is "objectively real" (see Mayr, 1942; and Munson, 1971,
section: The existence of species). It suggests that species are
classes, that is abstract, non-spatiotemporal rather than
"concrete entities" (Gregg, in Munson, p. 243). To
think "species" otherwise is, in part, a result of "the
insidiously misleading use of class expressions in place of
individual expressions; e.g., "'This species nests in oak trees'
for '”the members of this species nest in oak trees...'" (Greg, in
Munson, p. 243). In this way, the discrimination of
one species against other species is effected by a logico-linguistic
sleight of hand wherein the latter are reified. Even
when done in "humane" or ecological contexts, this misleading
reification perpetuates a cryptospeciesism. By way of
clarification of terms: "Speciation" refers to division into
species; while "pseudospeciation", a term coined by Erikson
(1985), refers to such divisions which clearly violate even a
moderately informed biology. By contrast, "speciesism" refers to
discrimination against an individual or group of individuals on
the basis of species membership. "Cryptospeciesism," then, refers
to such discrimination that, while occurring in the context of
practices that are apparently benevolent, are likely to have
insidious effects.
Adding to Ryder and Singer's concept, then, any position is
likely to be speciesist that gives consideration to a species as
a whole by the semantic-based ontological reversal of treating
that abstract class as a primary reality, in radical disregard
for the existence of the concrete individual members of that
class. "The coyote is making a comeback in Maine," is a
cryptospeciesist statement by this analysis. This is, then, a
form of discrimination that operates by the radical dissolution
of the individual in species other than one's own.
”The case for the prosecution: classical humanism's over-valuing of
individual human interest
That humanism gives itself a species name and that it takes
one species as its exclusive object of study and concern both
offer a certain ”prima facie• argument in support of the charge of
speciesism against it. But, surely, humanists are justified in
circumscribing the scope of their interests; specializing and
taking as a name that area of specialty is no crime. However, the
charge runs deeper and implicates the underlying philosophic
tradition that constitutes humanistic thought. To assess the case
against what Cave refers to as "the tradition of humanistic
speciesism" (1982. p. 251); to understand the prominent place
Singer gives to the critique of humanism in his philosophy (1975,
p. 205 ff.), the strength of Clark's "detest[ation
of]...transcendental humanists" (1984, p. 7), and Kohaks' charge
of humanism's role in the "heedless egotism of our species"
(1984, p. 110), we must offer an account of that philosophy.

Humanism as rationalism
In the standard account, (eg., Kurtz, 1973), humanism is a
development of the Enlightenment that revives and revises the
Roman humanitas to furnish a critique and alternative to medieval
scholasticism. Humanism defines and names itself by describing a
new way of life centering on ”human• interest instead of religious
or transcendental interest. To accomplish this shift, human is
defined as the locus of reason. Given the tyranny of late
medieval thought and institutions, this concept of reason had to
be closely connected to individual freedom. Reason is offered as
a form of thought that is at once free and freeing, free in the
sense that it can operate outside of the dogmatism, prejudice,
and irrationality of medieval ideology. Through the application
of free reason, a human being can become free; he or she can
become his or her own master, take his or her reasonable self as
the final and only authority. The concept of free reason, then,
is an ontological position, for it defines human being. It is
also an epistemological and, eventually, a methodological
position, for the ideal of free thought provides "a method of
free inquiry and critical intelligence" (Kurtz, 1973, p. 182).
Through reason, human being becomes a "person" in the modernist
sense of a relatively undetermined, separate and autonomous being
that can objectively know other beings. While humanism takes the
name of a species and defines and circumscribes a group, it is a
philosophy that values the ”individual•, not a group or
collectivity.
The critique of rationality
Clearly, much modern thought, culminating in postmodernism,
offers a critique of that valuing of the person, particularly of
individual freedom and autonomy. With Hegel (history), with Freud
and behaviorism (psychology), with Marx and modern sociology
(certain economic and social institutions), we have seen that
certain forces larger than the person shape him or her. We are
not fully independent or autonomous beings founded in a free
reason. Language itself has been recognized as a force which
challenges humanism's foundation in an autonomous reason and
intentional subject. Structuralism, poststructuralism, and
Foucault's archaeology give language a status as structure or
sociohistorical event beneath which we as human subject, agent,
and consciousness are subordinated. "Man" is a conduit of
language, or "...man is an invention of recent date" (Foucault,
1973, p. 387).
In the context of our concern with the charge of speciesism,
humanism's claims of the freedom and foundationalist status of
reason and of the primacy of the individual are not by themselves
a problem. Rather, it is the further claim that reason and
individuality are invested exclusively in human being. The
ancient motto from Protagoras, "'Man' is the measure of all
things," has come to mean not only that reason is the only
standard, but that human being is the only embodiment and
executor of that measure.
Classical humanism

The history of classical humanism can be schematically
presented as the tension between human being so construed as the
originary, individual or self-determining, exclusive locus of
reason and other competing centers of authority and determinative
power, as follows:
humanism: reason, free thought
1.
2.
3.
4.

God
nature
other large forces: society,history, language
science, technology

In the initial move, God and the superrational are
transformed into reason which is then invested in human being.
The church's claim of the existence of a transcendent
rationality is expropriated and placed in the world. However, to
consolidate this position further, human is then radically
distinguished from nonhuman animal with the claim that human
being is the exclusive repository of that now worldly reason. As
part of the same move, human being divests itself, at least in
terms of those features that are essential and valued, of a
certain instinct and need-dominated emotionality by transferring
it to nonhuman animals. In fact, the word chosen to carry these
now inhuman or at least inessential human aspects is, precisely,
"animal."
Given the two terms' respective etymologies, the fact of
this choice and the currency of its usage is an ironic
achievement. All animals are the etymological offspring of that
peculiar class of life forms that are endowed with breath or soul
(Latin: ”anima”), spirit or mind (Latin: ”animus”), and are quickened
(Latin: ”animare”), that is move on their own accord. On the other
hand, "human" comes from the Latin ”Humus•, for mould, ground,
soil. The formidableness of this achievement is further displayed
by contrasting it with a comparable move that helps sustain
sexism. In its vocabulary, "man" is the generic category under
which are subsumed the two sexes, male and female. In effect, by
making a superordinate out of a subcategory, a linguistic
structure is formed that lifts one sex up at the expense of the
second. A categorical hegemony corresponds with and legitimates
institutional discriminatory practice. However, by contrast, to
help create humanism, the generic "animal" under which human was
subsumed with all the other species, is now reduced to a
subordinate categorical position.
In any case, these moves which both deny reason to nonhuman
animals and base motives to humans, at least as an essential
feature, create a categorical gulf between human and nonhuman
animals, between, now, human and animal. Of course, the
intellectual contexts that make these moves possible are the
Christian and Cartesian distinctions, respectively, between
spirit/flesh and mind/body. (In her recent treatment of the

origin of the Christian version of this distinction, Pagels
[1988] shows that it is Augustine who develops the view that
individuals, following Adam's sin, are no longer free. "Fleshly
desire" is a symptom of bodily powers that are irresistible and
that necessarily corrupt the will.) In effect, "human" becomes
essentially mental and reasonable, while "animal" is constituted
as bodily, irrational and emotional, in a degraded and biologized
sense of the latter term.
Animals are not individuals
Further, "animal" is deindividuated, for reason is the ”sine
non qua• of person or individual. A being that is not essentially
free reason is not autonomous, is not an individual in the
peculiarly humanistic sense. In effect, a reference to the class
human signifies an aggregate of individuals; conversely, a
reference to one animal only thinly conceals a reference to an
abstract class.
Having constructed this categorical chasm of reason/unreason
and, based on it, of individual/abstract group, humanism then
offers the exclusive stuff of its own newfound essential being as
the only bridge across that chasm. (My analysis here is
influenced by Foucault's account of the social construction of
"madness" [1965]). If animals are different from us in lacking
reason and personhood and we are reasonable, we can only know
them through reason. The commonsensical observation from everyday
experience that we have some knowledge of the intentions and
experience of a nonhuman animal without the mediation of reason
is denied. But surely, I know my dog's intention to go outside or
his or her pain when I accidentally step on his or her tail by
something closer to immediate apprehension than through logical
deduction or some other rational inferential process. The denial
of this access requires an enterprise of experts in reason so
that we might (once again) understand these now radically "other"
nonhuman and nonindividual animals. Through an objective,
external investigatory posture based on inferential reason, a
natural science arises which claims to provide the only possible
intelligent access to animals and nature. Eventually, under the
auspices of this humanistically inspired scientific method,
animal and nature are reduced to matter in motion, effectively
becoming a dead region of being. Insidiously, we actually come to
experience the "natural," including the kingdom of animals,
precisely as this Galilean nature construct, losing touch with
our former participation in a natural rhythm and living
atmosphere (Kohaks, 1984).
The Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock, 1979) may be seen as a recent
attempt to recover a living nature and, with it, our lived
relation to both animate and inanimate nature. In its original
and strong form, recently weakened, Lovelock describes Earth
itself as a living entity, a kind of superorganism. I welcome the
attempt to revivify nature, including inanimate life, and our
relation to it. However, in the context of the present paper, I
interpret this move as an overcorrection at the other end of the
array of life --the animal/plant rather than the human/animal end.

Of necessity, I have limited my critique here to attempts to
establish a discrete line between human and animal. In doing so,
in seeking to blur the human/animal line, we are not required to
establish a strong distinction between animal, now including
human, and plant life. However, my view is that a number of
contemporary descriptions of the animal/plant and even the
living/nonliving interfaces inappropriately blur these latter two
distinctions. I have already referred to Stone's attribution, now
recanted, of interests to plants. I also include in these errors
on the far side of animality, Aldo Leopold's concept of community
applied to "the land", which includes soils, waters, plants and
animals (1949, p. 239) and Hartshorne's panpsychic process
philosophy which attributes weak forms of sentience and
individuality to plants and rocks (Dombrowski, 1988). My position
is closer to that of Hans Jonas, who maintains a strong
distinction between the "vegetative mode of life" and the
"phenomenon of animality" through a concept of distance©© the
gap between "urge and attainment", between organism and
environment (1966).
Animals are not subjects
Methodologically, animals become inaccessible except through
the distance of objective observation and inference. Initially
having been denied rational intelligence, this investigatory
posture toward animals allows humans to deny them intention and
purpose as well. They are no longer subjects of a world. More
subtly, aside from these results of this behavioristic
radicalization of external observation, investigators are only
apparently taking nonhuman animals as the object of their study.
Having defined animal largely in contradistinction to human and
as the embodiment of certain undesirable features of the human,
they select topic areas and construct research variables in terms
of, and to confirm, these categorical distinctions. For example,
they frame the study of language in animals with a certain
definitive notion of the syntax of human language. Ironically, so
biased, they generally find themselves in retreat, for as their
estimate of the capacities of nonhuman animal powers enlarges,
they must constrict their placement of the categorical battle
lines between human and animal: if not rationality, language; if
not language, syntax; if not syntax, symbol manipulation; if not
that, self-awareness.... As Clark (1984) states, "it is not that
we have ”discovered• them to lack a language but rather that we
define, and redefine, what Language is by discovering what beasts
do not have" (p. 96, his emphasis). The categorical chasm is
maintained.
A second strategy made possible by assigning high value
exclusively to human beings is our use of the nonhuman as a model
for the study of humans. This type of investigation is not
directed to an understanding of the nonhuman animal itself but to
the understanding of human beings. If nonhuman animals do not
reason and are not individuals, then they are not objects of
moral concern. Therefore, they can be manipulated, afflicted with
disease, deprived, socially isolated, addicted, driven crazy,

aversively conditioned, and the like. In addition to being
speciesist, this treatment of them is contradictory, for it is
premised on and justified by both the similarity and
differentness of human and nonhuman animals (Ryder, 1975. p. 2).
To sum the brief against humanism: Humanism led to a
modernity that is now under attack for its claims regarding a
fictive encapsulated, "free" individual; scientific humanism led
to a positivistic methodology under attack in both the natural
and social sciences.
In the present reading, classical humanism's rendering of
human being as free reason was both a categorical and
methodological overcorrection. Categorically, it radically
separated human from nonhuman animals on the basis of the
former's alleged exclusive possession of reason. Further, it
over©valued individuality as the reason-based locus of freedom.
If only a human is an individual, then a nonhuman animal must be
stripped of his or her individuality. Further, once an individual
is diminished in value in this way, the primary focus of
consideration becomes a new entity constructed out of an abstract
grouping of such former individuals--"species" is reified.
A methodological overcorrection was built on similar
grounds. In addition to locating reason only in human being, it
further claimed for reason the only access to truth. Thereby, it
denied our empathic sense of knowing and being with nonhuman
animals.
When we humans conceptualized a free human individual and
placed high value on individual human interests, when we denied
reason and individuality to nonhuman animals, when we developed
the methods that distanced us from nonhuman animals, and when we
abstracted and objectified the natural world, we provided a
framework powerfully conducive to speciesism.
By way of qualification, I am not providing in this brief
space historical evidence for the rise of speciesism out of
humanism. My claim is the more modest one that, based on
conceptual analysis, classical humanism allowed, encouraged,
almost demanded a speciesist attitude to nonhuman animals.
Despite their etymological beginnings in association with
air, spirit, and mind, it is they, the nonhuman animals, not we
humans, who in our imagination became dirt, dirty impulses,
unreasoned instinct, the beast. Despite their association with
free or autonomous movement, it is nonhuman animals, not we, who
became object, manageable resource, meat on the hoof, immobilized
experimental preparation, beings-for-us
A Humanistic psychology
Presumably, humanistic psychology both emerges out of
humanistic philosophy, in that it is a humanism, and leaves it
behind, in that it is a psychology. My examination of it here is
necessarily hampered by the facts that we are close to it in time
and perspective and that, after more than a quarter of a century
of development, it is hardly a monolithic enterprise (Smith,
1986, p. 8). In the present reading I will take two concepts as
constitutive—self-actualization (...”the central concept in

humanistic psychology...”[Lethbridge, 1986, p. 87])
and empathy (Rogers, 1980). If conceptual neatness were the order
of the day, the twin overcorrections considered earlier would be
corrected by these two concepts. Self©actualization would replace reason
and blur the human/animal categorical distinction; while empathy would
replace independent observation and inferenceas an exclusive
investigatory posture, diminishing the distance and exploitation of
nonhuman animals supported by the natural scientific method. Since the
situation is more complicated and such corrections have not, perhaps
cannot, be realized through these concepts, I take the above proposition
only as an organizing hypothesis.
Of course, the immediate context of the rising tide of
humanistic psychology, the "third force," is as a critique of
psychoanalytic and behavioristic psychology. In Wertz's account,
"The Rat in Psychological Science" (1986), a humanistic science
was required to rescue "human existence" from a "split" into the
"forbidden private intentions," the shadowy underworld of the
Freudian unconscious on the one hand, and the "controlled
behavior" of the early mechanistic behaviorism on the other (p.
152). I am sympathetic with Wertz's critique of scientific
psychology's "transposing the laboratory mode of existence onto
non-laboratory human life" (p. 156) and, at least generally, with
his suggestions for a "radical humanism" or human science that
might more fully salvage human being. However, my concern here is
whether this rescue operation, begun with the early rise of the
third force and continuing now with certain developments
influencing it (such as phenomenological psychology [Giorgi,
1970] and narratology [Ricoeur, 1984]) will take nonhuman animals
with it or abandon them in the laboratory. In the tradition of
classical humanism, will it perpetuate the use of "animal" as a
categorical foil?
In this regard, Wertz's piece itself is problematic. His
ingenious hermeneutic reading of psychology through the image of
the rat features the black rat as the "dark side of man" (p. 146)
of psychoanalysis, while the white rat is the sterilized,
denatured, "scientized" construction of behaviorism. While these
social constructions of the rat have obviously had enormous
impact on rats and the images have come to reflect, in part, the
reality of some of those animals, there is a rat, between, as it
were, the black and white rat. Wertz only refers to this rat in
passing for, quoting Zinsser, he reaches with him "the inevitable
conclusion: 'There is nothing that can be said in its [the rat's]
favor'" (p. 145). But a fuller account of rats, of their
marvelous physical and intellective abilities, of their social
organization and their "traditional transmission of experiences"
within their communities, and even their "immaculateness" prior
to their exposure to "soiling by civilization" into the "dirty
rat" is available (Hendricksen, 1983). Rats in nature are
formidable beings and well worthy of our respect. With Wertz, I
agree that for psychology to build a science on images of the rat
is a "serious betrayal of humanity" (p. 165). However, in the
present context, I must point to his omission of the fact that it
is a serious betrayal of animality as well.

If Wertz's radical humanism were realized, the consideration
that it would give to animals is not clear. Will our view of
animals be limited, as it is in Wertz's article, to using them as
objects that allow us to hold "the mirror before humanity" (p.
164) within a science whose apparently exclusive purpose is to
serve humanity? Of course, to so limit consideration of animals
would be to deny them full and equal consideration of their
interests.
Even if largely limiting animals' function to a symbolic
one, Wertz's piece is unusual in humanistic psychological
literature in its inclusion of nonhuman animals. It is typical in
its more or less exclusive concern with the concept of humanness
(Smith, 1986, p. 23) and in its effort to identify or constitute
a more fully human being and a more fully human science. Again,
such a project is not necessarily speciesist. Historically,
however, efforts to ennoble humanity rarely escape taking
nonhuman animals as the fall guy (Shepard, 1965, p. 248). An
enterprise and ideology bent on such ennoblement tends to
promote, referring back to Singer's definition, "...a prejudice
or act of bias toward the interests of one's own species..."
As we, for example, restore intention and purpose as
constitutive of human being, will we also restore it to animals?
Will they accompany us in our escape from the laboratory, that
hall of mirrors in which we constructed them as "the beast" and
as "controllable", predictable object? Let us look more closely
at prominent constitutive concepts in humanistic psychology to
further assess the current and future status of nonhuman animals
in a humanistic psychology.
Broadening reason to experience
By contrast to classical humanism, humanistic psychology
invokes a much broader concept of reason which includes all
consciousness or experience, and which emphasizes, in particular,
"visceral experiencing (Rogers, 1980, p. 159), or "felt-meaning"
(Gendlin, 1962), or "what you really feel... (Barton, 1974). In
the present context, upgrading, roughly speaking, the emotional
aspects of experience to greater parity with reason loosens the
tyranny of logical deduction and lightens the overburdened
associations of human with reason and nonhuman animals with
emotion. This leaves an opening for a less discrete
human/nonhuman animal distinction. As we will see in a moment, it
also allows the restoration of the body, particularly the lived
body that was given up for the sake of a disembodied, formalistic
notion of pure reason. However, as part of the same move emotion
is linked to imagination, creativity, and spirituality, in a word
to the "farther reaches of human nature" and the program of a
human potential movement. Thereby, a new ground of a
human/nonhuman animal categorical cleavage is created. It is not
clear, then, whether this shift from a biologized and degraded
view of emotionality and the body has redeemed animality.
Self-actualization

In any case the emphasis on feelings is part of a more
primary concept in humanistic psychology, that of self-actualization.
Maslow describes it as a "tendency to growth or
self-perfection" 1962, p. 21). This concept retains the classical
humanistic emphasis on and close linkage of individuality and
freedom. Individuality is the realization of a largely a priori
set of "talents, capacities, and potentialities" (p. 27) that
include the physical, emotional, social and moral as well as the
intellective. Reasoning is no longer given special status in this
process.
There is an ambiguity here, though in the emphasis on
individuality, for there is also an insistence in both Maslow and
Rogers on certain ”universal• features that emerge with or through
self©actualization. As Barton states with reference to Roger's
client-centered therapy, the self realized is a self that
consists of certain needs and characteristics, "a self that
transcends any particular individual (1974, p. 198).
With respect to freedom, the self realized through the
self-actualization process, the only authentic self, is precisely
the definition of a free self. It is free in that it unfolds
independently of external determination. In the case of a free
self, the social environment's function is limited to the
provision of a generalized nourishment or fostering or
facilitating acceptance. Unlike in classical humanism, in this
concept of individual freedom reason does not play the critical
role. The self-actualizing tendency itself, not reasoning,
safeguards and constitutes freedom through the realization of ”all
aspects of one's given inner nature.”
Maslow's discussion takes human being as its subject. What
does he intend with respect to nonhuman animals? As does Rogers
(1965, p. 489), he gives Goldstein's work a seminal place in the
origin of the concept of self-actualization (p. 21). While we
cannot do justice to Goldstein's position here (see Grene, 1965,
chapter 5), suffice to say that he used the term to refer to
human and nonhuman animals ("organisms"). Clearly, as a
philosophical biologist, he intended self-actualization to apply
across species.
However, Maslow draws a strong distinction between
deficiency or basic or instinctoid and growth needs or motives,
between a motivation based on tension reduction, defense, and
conservation, and one based on self-perfection (pp. 20-21). The
latter is the heart of his version of the concept of self
actualization. With respect to nonhuman animals, then, he states,
"It may be that animals have only deficiency needs. Whether or
not this turns out to be so, in any case we have treated animals
as if this were so..." (p. 25). Certainly,contemporary ethological
literature shows that it did not turn out to be so. (See, for example,
Goodall's [1986] description of sophisticated aspects of chimpanzees.) In
any case, clearly Maslow largely accepted a rough dichotomy, comparable
to the traditional higher/lower animals, between deficiency and growth
needs, where only the latter applied to humans. Further, only the
growth needs can be met independently of the environment, and,
therefore, only human beings can be free individuals or free
selves (pp. 31©2). From my point of view this is an arrangement

that is structurally similar to the human/animal, reason/unreason
dichotomized hierarchy of classical humanism.
There is a considerable critique of self-actualization both
within (Smith, 1972; Geller, 1982; Lethbridge, 1986; Shaw and
Colimore, 1988; Daniels, 1988; and Wilson, 1988) and without
humanistic psychology (Wallach and Wallach, 1983, chapters 7,8).
Lethbridge summarizes the attack from within in terms of the
"asocial, ahistorical, and innate" self that is to be actualized
(p. 85). Following Nord (p. 89) and from his own Marxist
position, he also criticizes humanistic psychology's concept of
person for its underestimation of the role of social and economic
forces in the shaping of the individual. In the terms of my
analysis, Maslow's position is an overcorrection that denies the
power of other large forces as competing centers of determinative
power. As in the classical humanistic self, the self as conceived
by Maslow is hyper-independent, encapsulated, dissociated from the
world.
Developments within humanistic psychology since Maslow have
attempted to complement this encapsulated self with the belated
recognition that individual growth and self definition are
necessarily functions of reciprocal influence between individual
and society (Simpson, 1977; and Wilson, 1988). Nonetheless, this
highly individualistic notion of the natural unfolding and
expression of a given or inner self may be interpreted as an
Americanization of classical humanism. Maslow and Roger's work
continues the line of Emerson's self-reliance, Thoreau's retreat
from and disavowal of society's laws and ways, and Whitman's "I
celebrate myself..." A recent essay (Marx, 1987) describes this
Emersonian revival,although without connecting Maslow or Rogers to it.
It is not clear that Sipe's (1986) and Lethbridge's (1986) attempts
to graft onto self-actualization an individual/social dialectic and a
genuine social theory of change can or should save this concept as the
concept for humanistic psychology. For these changes strike at the heart
of Maslow and Roger's faith in an essentially monadic self that is
ideally only nourished, not formed or even coconstituted, and certainly
not socially constructed by and in the world. The thrust of
postmodern thought suggests we abandon that notion of a natural
or biologically given self (as well as the freely chosen, nothing
self of a radical existentialism and the transcended and negated
self of Buddhism [Fontana, 1987]).
While self-actualization as an organizing concept of person
originates in a biology of all animals, as appropriated by
humanistic psychology it reinstates a categorical divide which is
then vulnerable to speciesist attitudes and discrimination,
exemplified by Ehrenfeld's charge of arrogance (1978) and Lasch's
charge of narcissism (1979). Further, while Goldstein's original
conception emphasized holism, an organism embedded in a field, we
are left with a view of self that deemphasizes the radical
embeddedness of such part-whole relations.For this reason and in
that it limits itself to humans, such a concept of self is
unlikely to produce a concrete concern for the plight of
individual nonhuman animals. In those moments when it does foster
an identification of self with world, rather than with the
internal unfolding process of self-realization, that

identification is likely to be limited to a global sympathy with
an abstract or generalized natural world. A study by Duhl (1986)
illustrates this in its evocation of a metaphoric relation
between self and sky.
Empathy
Given the critique of the concept of self-actualization, I
believe we should put more burden on a concept of empathy to
sustain a humanistic psychology. Already in humanistic psychology
there is at least the kernel of a more adequate concept of an
empathic self that both might allow the lowering of the
categorical divide between human and nonhuman animal, and serve
as the basis of a methodology broadened beyond the constraints of
a positivistic science. In the remainder of this paper I provide
a brief critique of the current concept of empathy and suggest a
direction for its modification. In an earlier paper, I more fully
explicate a concept of empathy (in press).
For the later Rogers, despite its titular role as "a way of
being" (1980), empathy remains limited in role to a therapeutic
and educational tactic. It is a means provided to a person to
help him or her self-actualize. While it is claimed that the
actualized self tends toward altruism, community, and empathy,
the latter is not taken as a primary constitutive feature of the
self. In part through the empathy of the therapist/teacher, the
client/student is enabled to be more sensitive to an experiencing
self known through an internal focus. The primary move of the
client is not to become the therapist or as the therapist, as the
client would if he or she became empathic. Rather, the client
becomes the unique self that was already there internally,
waiting to be realized. Empathy is derivative of this self and in
its service. Employing the work of Buber, Friedman (1976) makes
the stronger criticism that focus on the world or on the other
person, not on the self directly, is the only way to realize the
self. In his terms, the self cannot be realized by "aiming at
the self."
Clearly, a concept of empathy subordinated to the self of
the self-actualization process is burdened by the ontological
shortcomings of the encapsulated self. If a person is not
originally in the world in the sense of being out there and
having direct access to others, he or she can not know that world
except by inference or analogy. It follows that no genuine,
worldly, engaged empathy is possible.
Methodological limitations follow from this ontology, as I
have discussed. For all his faith in the therapist's capacity for
empathy, Rogers did not build an investigatory method on a
radical or genuine concept of empathy. Instead of the
investigator as an involved participant who knows the other
through immediate apprehension or intuition, Rogers as
investigator remains much closer to a traditional investigative
posture in which separation and distance require external
inference. In the terms of my analysis here, Rogers' methodology
operates well within the rubric of the classical concept of
reason.

Empathy as bodily habitation
In various literatures in Eastern philosophy, in feminist
theory, and in existential phenomenology, there are accounts of a
self that is radically "in relation"-- in the world. In
existential phenomenology there are at least two seminal accounts
of a concept of empathy which give it a more genuinely
constitutive status for human being and a potentially more
radical role in an investigatory enterprise: Heidegger's
description of ”dasein• as an open responsiveness and attunement
that lets be (1962) and Merleau-Ponty's notion of inhabitation
(1962). For the Merleau-Ponty of ”Phenomenology of Perception, the
body is the condition for the possibility of our immediate
apprehension of the world. In the ordinary course of living, we
do not know objects by inference or representation but by a
direct access to them made possible by the mobility of our body.
Through our bodily scheme, we can virtually or potentially
inhabit an object and know it from its point of view, as if it
could see.
For Merleau-Ponty, the body that inhabits objects
does so by carrying with it a rich sense of already being
informed by objects in the world. The lived body is an open
system, an evolving repertoire of the moves made in coming to
know the world. As Merleau-Ponty was influenced by Goldstein's
work (1963), this conception of the person is sympathetic to
Goldstein's notion of holism or embeddedness.
This rendering of empathy as bodily inhabitation is not
limited to the apprehension of physical based vantage points of
inanimate "viewers" (in Merleau-Ponty's example, the lamp on the
table's view of the chimney [p. 68]). Sociality is based on our
originary inclination to inhabit each other's point of view in
the full sense of that term--to apprehend the style and substance
of each other's intended world.
However, our sociality is not limited to humans. Drawing on
Merleau-Ponty, early philosophical biologists such as Plessner
and Portmann, and contemporary ethology, I have shown elsewhere,
that nonhuman animals have and are a point of view (Shapiro,
1987). Nonhuman animals live in a largely prelinguistic yet
meaningful world which they know through their own lived body. My
dog knows the living room where he and I play as a set of paths
traversed and paths prohibited by custom: the sofa he is not
allowed on, or physically, the table he cannot fit under. He
knows my maneuvers to catch him, including my feints and deceits.
His intelligence is largely bodily for it consists of a sense of
a potential space and correlative potential moves©©of paths to be
traversed, of secure spots to hide or keep warm in or from which
to keep watch, of territory staked out, of social relations to be
enacted. An animal's experience is of a phenomenal field, of a
possible lived space with respect to which he or she is a center
of action. On an implicit bodily level, he or she takes up a
position and establishes a place©©his home, or playing room, or
territory.

Under the term "kinesthetic empathy" (Shapiro, in press), I
describe a method for the study of nonhuman animals based on the
possibility of direct apprehension of his or her lived body and
its correlative ”umwelt.” The methodology is mixed, integrating
knowledge of the history of the individual animal and explication
of the social construction of that animal (as "pet", favored
species, or the like). However, it relies on the possibility of
empathizing with the postures and movements of an individual
animal, critically tempered and informed by that history and
social construction. As investigator, I can know the space of his
world by kinesthetically empathizing with his bodily postures,
inclinations and moves. Empathy is not limited to an access to
affective life, nor to some perceptible surface of the other
being beneath which lurks an inner life only suggested. Rather,
we can empathize body to body with a preferred position (my dog's
combined look-out, secure lair on our stairway landing) or an
intended behavior (his intention to go outdoors). Despite the
pitfalls of anthropomorphizing or "projecting," the claim is made
that we, in principle, can (and in our daily living do) relate to
individual animals through direct understanding of their
intentions, inclinations, and interests. This is possible because
we share with them an intelligence based on our respective bodily
involvement in the world. Both human and nonhuman animals move,
know the world through that movement, and have a sense of our
moves. In a word, we are all embodied consciousnesses.
In the present context, I am suggesting the possibility of a
humanistic psychology built ontologically and methodologically on
a modified concept of empathy. It would give empathy constitutive
status in human being and allow us genuine access to each other
and to nonhuman animals. Unlike a notion of reason that separates
us from nonhuman animals and a notion of self-actualization that
gives us a self-centered focus, this concept of person precisely
puts us out there with other beings.
A psychology based on empathy does not require that we
assert that humans are indistinguishable from animals. Nonhuman
animals can have a bodily sense of our intentions, can empathize
kinesthetically. However, unlike us, they cannot reflect on their
empathic belonging. The animal "...”is• a self, but does not yet
”have” a self to which in turn it can take a stand in reflective
awareness" (Grene, on Plessner, 1965, p. 99). In other terms, the animal,
as a living body possessed by a subject,is an individual; but one that
cannot know itself as such. Of course, the most insidious forms of
exploitation can follow upon our human capacity for reflective empathy,
but it is also the ground for the possibility of an ethic of respect for
other ways of being. A humanistic psychology based on a genuine empathy
allows us and obligates us to live with each other and with other
beings without the distanciation, denial of intimacy and selfcenteredness rationalized by the encapsulated self. Through it,
there is a possible compatibility between humanistic psychology
and animal r
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